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ABSTRACT
The Internet is an evolving, robust system with built in redundancy to ensure the flow of infor-
mation regardless of any act of nature or man-made event. This makes mapping the Internet a
daunting task, but important because understanding its structure helps identifying vulnerabilities
and possibly optimizing traffic through the network. We explore CAIDA’s and NPS’s probing
methodologies to verify the assentation that NPS’s probing methodology discovers comparable
Internet topologies in less time. We compare these by modeling union of traceroute outputs
as graphs, and using standard graph theoretical measurements as well as a recently introduced
measurement. Ultimately, the researchers verified the NPS’s probing methodology was com-
parable to the CAIDA’s probing methodology. We also propose additional avenues for further
exploration from our initial discoveries. We also introduced a technique that can possibility
identify stable core existence among the whole Internet and explore case studies of two country
sub-graphs.
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Executive Summary
The Internet is an evolving, robust system with built in redundancy to ensure the flow of infor-
mation regardless of any act of nature or man-made event. This makes mapping the Internet a
daunting task, but important because understanding its structure helps identifying vulnerabilities
and possibly optimizing traffic through the network. We explore CAIDA’s and NPS’ probing
methodologies to verify the assentation that NPS’ probing methodology discovers comparable
Internet topologies in less time. We compare these by modeling union of traceroute outputs as
graphs, and study the graphs by using vertex and edge count, average vertex degree, clustering
coefficient and the Pearson coefficient. The results from these measures show CAIDA’s and
NPS’s probing methdologies are compromable. However, using a recently introduced measure-
ment, the probing methodologies actual discover up to 40 percent different sets of vertices and
edges captured during almost simulanteous probing. Ultimately, the researchers verified that the
NPS’s probing methodology was comparable to the CAIDA’s probing methodology. We also
proposed additional avenues for further exploration from our initial discoveries. We introduced
a technique that can possibily identify stable core existence. We conducted preliminary analy-
sis on the interesection of six inferred topologies with promising results. We believe additional
probing samples might display the stable core of the Internet. Additionally, we identified South
Korea and China as skewed for the NPS probing methodology and conducted a case study of
each. We analyzed using the standard graph comparision measures and the intersection to iden-
tify a possible stable core. We observed only five percent of stable vertices in China but 40
percent in South Korea.
xvii
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Throughout time societies have constantly explored ways to communicate, despite vast dis-
tances, either for control, correspondence, commerce or spread of knowledge. We build vast
networks to efficiently and rapidly broadcast the information with the newest technology at the
time, (e.g., smoke signals, pony express, and telegraph systems). Recently, the computer age
has increased the available amount of information which has consumed the inferior methods of
distribution before it. This led the United States government to commission a more robust and
fault tolerant communications system during the 1960s making way for the Advanced Research
Projects Agency Network (ARPANet) which eventually became the Internet.
Unfortunately, with the decommission of the ARPANet, the Internet structure became decentral-
ized, thus harder to map. The physical structure of the Internet became proprietary technology
to different business organizations making it difficult to understand how truly information is
shared. This has made it increasingly difficult for people to effectively and successfully map
the topology of the Internet. Thus a common interest in understanding exactly how links/edges
are assigned among routers/nodes has emerged, with the main goal of developing algorithms to
track the topology. The current thesis will address this with the goal of measuring and compar-
ing outputs of two such algorithms.
1.2 Why Measure the Internet?
Developing an approximate Internet map is important because having an understanding about
how routers connect and interact with each other can lead to better security, or increased ef-
ficiency of traffic flow. The algorithms developed to discover the topology of the Internet are
useful in understanding how an adversary can limit the exchange of information or completely
disable the accessibility of a local network. This is just one type of attack that is commonly re-
ferred to as a denial of service (DoS) or similarly a distributed denial of service (DDoS) which
targets a system by typically overloading it either through bandwidth or memory. This is a
very effective method of disruption which countries and companies spend billions of dollars
to prevent. With an understanding of the Internet topology, we can help to mitigate some of
the bandwidth bottlenecking that DoS attacks target. Additionally, it could help us understand
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where to create better redundancy in the network that will prevent accidental DoS by an organi-
zation similar to DigitalGlobe’s recent request for users help to scour through vast amounts of
satellite imagery to find the missing Malaysian Air flight 370 [1].
1.3 Research Question
We began our research wanting to know the following questions.
• What are the substantiative differences between the NPS probing methodology and the
CAIDA probing methodology?
• Is there any bias in the algorithms?
• Does one algorithm geographically, by country, discover more of a network?
We were limited on our research by the number of probing cycles available for analysis. We
investigated the available probing cycles and made some educated inferences to how NPS and
CAIDA algorithms compare to each other.
1.4 Thesis Contribution
We use existing graphical analysis to compare large graphs at a very course granularity. We
did this to check similarity of the multiple probing cycles using the existing analysis tools,
(i.e., average degree, vertice count, edge count and clustering coefficient). We then used a
recently introduced concept of VSD and ESD to compare vertex to vertex and edge to edge how
similar two probing cycles are to discovering the same topology. Next we found the intersection
between cycles to identify the amount of the Internet that we call the Stable Core found by each
probing methodology. We then compared CAIDA and NPS probing methodology’s Stable Core
to discover similarities. We then compare sub-graphs (data divided by country) to find which
probing methodology more accurately represents the Internet. We compared the number of
vertices within each country and check if it represents the reported Internet users in [2] and
country allocated IP space.
1.5 Organization of Thesis
In investigating the research question, this thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 1 discusses the motivation of the research.
• Chapter 2 discusses prior and related work in the fields of measuring the Internet.
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• Chapter 3 introduces the machinery used in the analysis conducted in the course of the
research.
• Chapter 4 details the data used and the methodology that was developed.
• Chapter 5 contains the results of case studies conducted using our measures.
• Chapter 6 contains the summary and discusses possible areas for future work.
3




In this chapter, we establish a base knowledge of the Internet and some key terminology. This
will allow a common language for understanding how the Internet is formed, controlled and
how it evolved in time.
2.1 Overview of the Internet
The Internet is a global system of connected routers which follow an agreed-upon standard of
protocol suites. These protocols are established through the Internet Engineering Task Forces
(IETFs) and published in Request for Comments (RFCs)1 that serve billions of users worldwide.
The protocols are known as IPs, which are similar to a mailing address. Information is first
packeted with the destination addresses and are routed by routers within Autonomous Systems
(ASes) where information is then transmitted. The ASes are a group of IP prefixes, under central
control of one or more network operators that presents a common, clearly defined routing policy
to the Internet [4]. The routes are nothing more then a path connecting vertices (users) through
ASes to each other.
We view the Internet as a group of many symbiotic communities that operate as collective
ASes. These ASes work together by connecting to each other forming larger networks. The
AS is typically an Internet service provider (ISP) or other large organization with connections
to multiple other ASes (e.g., Comcast, Verizon and universities). Each AS has an officially
registered Autonomous System Number (ASN) and adheres to the RFCs to properly route the
information. When multiple routers establish connections/edges with other routers, they build a
routing table and share their table among all the connected routers. The routers distribute these
tables in order to compute the most efficient paths that adhere to the businesses constraints of
the providers. This occurs because the routers identify preferred routes between themselves to
other routers/vertices. However, there exists a delineation between internal and external routers
within an AS. Internal routers will only handle the traffic within their ASes and will refer to all
ingress facing or transit routers for any connection outside their organic ASes. The internal AS
routers can save IP space by allowing large companies to subdivide the company’s network to
enable more users without affecting the ingress router, an expression called "piggybacking" or
1Document series containing technical and organizational notes about the Internet [3].
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"subnetting." Likewise, all ingress/external routers will ignore any subnetting groups of large
networks, namely their own AS and outside AS. The design of internal and ingress/external
routers help to reduce the number of entries in the ingress/external transit routing tables. The
router accomplishes this by delegating some roles to the internal routers within the ASes and
other responsibilities to the ingress/external routers.
In Figure 2.1 [5], the boundary routers (e.g., R11, R12, R21 and R31 in Figure 2.1) are ingress
routers that bridge the ASes. These routers are commonly referred to as ingress, while internal
routers such as R13, and R14 in Figure 2.1 handle the traffic inside their AS. Physically, the
routers are connected, via their interfaces, and wired or wireless connections between interfaces
on other routers/devices. A trivialized representation of the Internet is shown in Figure 2.1
where the ASes are identified by their respective ASNs. In this illustration, the transit 2 edges
connect ASN 1 to ASN 2 and ASN 1 to ASN3.
Figure 2.1: The Internet simplified from [5].
2Edge between two external routers.
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2.2 Internet Topology
The true Internet topology is a difficult problem to truly represent due to the ever changing
structure of the Internet, sheer size and evolution. When we map the Internet we are looking
at a "snap shot" in time of what the Internet looked like. The research community hopes that
taking multiple "snap shots" throughout time will allow the researcher to map and gain some
insight to the Internet’s structure. For our research, what is more arduous is what these "snap
shots" mean and how we compare them, before being able to predict how the Internet will act.
2.2.1 Levels of Internet Topology
There are numerous granularity levels we can study within the Internet, (e.g., fiber, IP address,
router, and ASes). For each level, we represent a fictitious network with a corresponding graph-
ical representation(s). We are particularly interested in interface-level mapping because it offers
the most clarity of connectivity and if we have the IP level graph, then the others could be in-
ferred. We limit our research to this interface-level and the connectivity of the segments of the
Internet. Below we discuss the different levels for completeness.
AS-level topology. At the AS level, the ASes are vertices and communication paths between
them form edges between the vertices. This is seen more prominently as provider-customer and
peer relations [6]. With this system, a customer pays a provider to connect to the Internet outside
of its administrative domain. Then these providers contractually agree to exchange information
traffic between each other’s customers mostly free of charge. Thus, the Intranets and their
connections that the ISPs provide to its customers form the Internet between the administrative
domains. This means that the AS level captures more of an economic relationship between ISPs
rather than the physical connections between routers of the Internet.
The AS-level graph representation of Figure 2.2a is shown in Figure 2.2b from [5].
Subnet-level topology. Subnet-level mapping [7] involves discovering the IP addresses that are
hosted on the same subnet. These subnets are defined by the interfaces that they connect to. The
subnet level topology has the subnets as the vertices and the routers as the edges connecting the
various subnets. This methodology is shown in Figure 2.3 from [5].
Interface-level topology. Interface-level or IP level routing works similarly as subnet-level
mapping because router interfaces and end hosts are captured. The connections between two
router interfaces form an edge, while the interfaces themselves are the vertices. It is important to
note how routers can have multiple interfaces, which could require multiple graphs to ensure the
7
(a) Network map. (b) Graph.
Figure 2.2: Autonomous System-level representations from [5].
(a) Network map. (b) Graph.
Figure 2.3: Subnet-level representations from [5].
discovery of all connections/edges between the routers. Figure 2.4 [5] displays some variations
of graphs depicting various perspectives to different end points.
Router-level topology. Routers have multiple interfaces, each with a different IP address,
and by IP Alias Resolution 3 they are combined to represent one vertex in the Router-level
graph. These vertices are then connected by edges, which represent a possible physical link
between the routers. These vertices and edges form the graph used to represent the Internet.
3A process to identify IPs which belong to the same router.
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(a) Network map.
(b) Graph of interfaces as seen
from X.
(c) Graph of interfaces as seen
from Y.
(d) Graph of interfaces as seen
from Z.
(e) Graph of interfaces as seen
from R22.
(f) Graph of interfaces as seen from
R31.
Figure 2.4: Interface-level representations from [5].
The topology of these graphs formed from this method are more useful because the vertices
represent the physical routers and the edges the physical links/edges of the actual physical
network layout. However, IP Alias Resolution is not precise, although current research shows
promise in solving this problem [8–10]. Thus, having an understanding at the IP level will help
9
generate an understanding of the Internet at the router level.
(a) Network map. (b) Graph.
Figure 2.5: Router-level representations from [5].
2.2.2 Acquiring Active Network Topology
There are numerous Network Topology Capture (NTC) algorithms to acquire network topolo-
gies including, DIMES, IPlane, Ark IPv4 All Prefix /24 and recently NPS probing methodol-
ogy. NPS probing methodology is different from the others because it includes adaptive probing
techniques which leverage ingress knowledge and data from previous cycles(s) to choose the
best probe destination and assignment of vantage point to destination [11]. The idea is by ex-
ploiting previous knowledge of the data, one can reduce the cost, mainly time and additional
traffic load on the Internet. NTC’s goal is to reduce the discovery costs (i.e., probes sent and
time discovery time), while ensuring maximum coverage of the network [12]. However, there
are limitations of NTCs from offline systems, firewalls or overloaded edges during the time of
probing. In [13], the authors investigated if the time of day for a probing cycle matters. They
did not find evidence that the time of the day matters, but they caution that their sampling size
was small and additional research should be done.
Ideally, we want to use ground-truth 4 to compare the effectiveness of NTC algorithms. Unfor-
tunately, it is impossible to obtain ground-truth because many organizations will not share the
information for security reasons. An organization’s network graph can expose security flaws
and allow the possibility of sabotage. Organizations like CAIDA provide datasets [14] from
both active and passive measurement of the Internet that are readily available to the research
community. We will use some of CAIDA’s datasets throughout our research, which of course
is not ground-truth, but it provides us data to compare NPS’s probing methodology.
4Actual existing graph of a real network.
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2.2.3 Traceroute
Traceroute is a network diagnostic tool that allows a user to identify how a network sends
information between devices/vertices. The use of traceroute allows a user to assess a network to
help identify and fix connection issues. Typically most traceroutes use Internet control message
protocol (ICMP) and a Time to live (TTL) that increment at every point of routing. This is
useful because after the completion of each trace, a history of the forward interface-level path
and time to send and acknowledge are available to analyze. However, traceroute may not return
all router path information because some routers are formated to reply anomalously.
Paris traceroute improved traceroute by accommodating load balancing routers [15, 16]. The
improvement provides more accurate information to paths along a network because the load
balancing routers have the ability to direct information or probes along different paths and hide






















Figure 2.6: Classic versus Paris traceroute adapted from [5, 15].
Figure 2.6 illustrates how the Paris traceroute is preferred over the classic traceroute. The
left diagram in Figure 2.6 provides the ground-truth of the network where router L provides
load balancing across two paths. The middle diagram shows the representation of traceroute
11
result, while the one of the right is the Paris traceroute. The Paris traceroute captures a better
representation of the real topology of the network.
2.3 Existing Internet Topology Views
There are many different views to the exact structure of the Internet and how to graphically
represent the Internet. In Figure 2.7, the Internet has a core of fiber-optic cables connecting
ISPs to the end users, (i.e., home and business users).
Figure 2.7: Visualization of USA Internet from [17].
Another view many researchers share is that the Internet is a heuristically optimal topology
where the core is sparse with low degree routers which connect to high degree edge providers
then to hosts/end users. An example of this structure is found in Figure 2.8a.
Both of the views on the Internet structure are currently accepted by researchers. We also
wanted to show some previous graphical representation of the Internet from actual traceroutes.
Cheswick has done considerable research in developing an algorithm to display traceroute in-
formation obtained primarily from CAIDA. An example of some of his visualizations of the
Internet are found in Figure 2.9. Cheswick has named the Internet images as a "Peacock on a
Windshield." Another Internet visualization example is found in Figure 2.10. This visual only
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(a) Network map. (b) Router-level topology of Abilene.
Figure 2.8: Router-level representations from [18].
displays the backbone of the Internet, but shows that even smaller subsets of the Internet are
overwhelming to visually analyze.
Figure 2.9: Cheswick map of Internet from [19].
We will model snapshots of the Internet by graphs to facilitate its measurement. We will use
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Figure 2.10: CAIDA IP map of Internet from [20].
python coding (particularly NetworkX) to analyze existing data comparison algorithms. Addi-
tionally, we will refer to CAIDA’s measuring tools to compare large networks and we append
additional tools. As previously mentioned, we will model the Internet at the interface-level
using multiple "snap shots," with the a vertex representing an interface or IP and an edge repre-




In this chapter, we introduce some mathematical theory that will create a common language
as we refer to the Internet as a graph. We focus on set theory, graph theory and established
complex graph comparison tools. These tools are helpful to compare large graphs because of
ease of calculation and mathematically proven characteristics. Additionally, we will introduce
a technique we believe will lead into understanding the stable core of the Internet.
3.1 Set Theory Terminology and Terms
A basic understanding in set theory will allow the reader to follow the results obtained from the
measures of similarities and differences between graphs. We also use graph theory to understand
the characteristics that large data sets exhibit, allowing further insight into the information’s
meaning. We accomplish this by taking the large data sets and turning them into graphs. We
then run existing measures in NetworkX5 to aid in understanding the data behind the graphs.
The following definitions for Set Theory are found in [21]. The terminology and theory are a
base knowledge and reference to understand our methodology and results.
A set G is an unordered collection of objects, called elements or members of the set. A set is
said to contain its elements. We write a ∈ A to denote that a is an element of the set A. The
notation a 6∈ A denotes that a is not an element of the set A.
The union, A∪B, of the sets A and B, denoted by A∪B, is the set that contains those elements
that are either in A or in B, or in both, see Figure 3.1.
The intersection, A∩B, of the sets A and B, denoted by A∩B, is the set containing those
elements in both A and B, see Figure 3.1.
The generalized unions of a collection of sets is the set that contains those elements that are
members of at least one set in the collection (e.g., Figure 3.2).
While the generalized intersections of a collection of sets is the set that contains those elements
that are members of all the sets in the collection also as seen in Figure 3.2.
5Python based software package for creation, manipulation, and study of the structure, dynamics and functions
of complex networks.
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(a) Union of A and B. (b) Intersection of A and B.
Figure 3.1: Union and intersection from [21].
(a) Union of A, B, and C. (b) Intersection of A, B and C.
Figure 3.2: Generalized Union and intersection from [21].
The Symmetric Difference of A and B, A⊕B, is the set containing those elements in exactly
one of A and B, see Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Symmetric Difference A⊕B.
3.2 Graph Theory Terminology and Concepts
The below definitions and concepts are found in [22]. Any additional terminology we will
individually reference.
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A graph G consists of a finite nonempty set V of objects called vertices and a set E of 2-element
subsets of V called edges, see Figure 3.4. The sets V and E are the vertex set and the edge set
of G, respectively. Vertices are also called points or nodes and edges are sometimes called lines
or arcs. For Figure 3.4, the vertex set is
V (G) = {c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7}







Figure 3.4: Example graph.
Node or vertex Count The vertex count of a graph G, commonly denoted |V (G)| or |G|, is the
number of vertices in G. In other words, it is the cardinality of the vertex set.
The edge Count of a graph G, commonly denoted M(G) or E(G) and sometimes also called
the edge number, is the number of edges in G. In other words, it is the cardinality of the edge
set.
A path is used to describe both a manner of traversing certain vertices and edges of G and a
subgraph consisting of the sequence of those vertices and edges. A path is a u− v walk in a
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graph in which no vertices are repeated. An example of a path in Figure 3.4, from c1 to c4 is
P = (c1,c3,c4)
and it is not unique since there also exist another path.
P = (c1,c2,c3,c4)
There are actually multiple paths from c1 to c4.
A graph G is connected if every two vertices of G are connected, that is, if G contains a path
u−v for every pair u,v of vertices of G. A graph G that is not connected is called disconnected.
A trail is terminology borrowed from the Old West and defined as a u−v trail in a graph G to be
a u− v walk in which no edge is traversed more than once. An example of a trail in Figure 3.4,
from c5 to c2 is
T = (c5,c4,c6,c7,c4,c2)
and can repeat vertices as we did with c4. A circuit in a graph G is a closed trail of length 3 or
more. Our previous example of a trail can be a circuit, c5, ...,c5, but another example is a circuit




this shows a circuit is not unique between two vertices. A cycle is a circuit that repeats no
vertex, except for the first and last. A k− cycle is a cycle of length k, (i.e., k vertices), for
example a 3− cycle is commonly referred to as a triangle. From Figure 3.4 an example of a
3− cycle is
C3 = (c1,c5,c3,c1)
while an example of a 5− cycle is
C4 = (c1,c2,c3,c4,c7,c1)
The degree of a vertex v in a graph G is the number of edges incident with v. For example in
18
Figure 3.4 the degree of c7.
deg c7 = 4
For two vertices u and v in a graph G, the distance d(u,v) from u to v is the length of a shortest
u− v path in G. A u− v path of length d(u,v) is called a u− v geodesic. The path c1,c5,c4 is a
geodesic from c1 to c4.
For a vertex v in a connected graph G, the eccentricity e(v) of v is the distance between v
and a vertex farthest from v in G. The minimum eccentricity among the vertices of G is its
radius and the maximum eccentricity is its diameter, with are denoted by rad(G) and diam(G),
respectively. For example, e(c1) = 2 , rad(G) = 2 and diam(G) = 2.
Symmetric difference [23] Conventionally, if G and H are graphs with vertex set V , then the
symmetric difference G4H is the graph with vertex set V whose edges are all those edges
appearing in exactly one of G and H. Note that the G4H the set operation of symmetric
difference is done on the edges of the graph, and it is not what we use in this research.
In this paper, we model Internet connections as an undirected graph. We do this because the
nature of bi-directional information exchanged on the Internet between endpoints. Therefore,
we will not use directed graphs, pseudo graphs or multi-graphs to represent the Internet from
our data.
3.3 Complex Network Measures
In our analysis we use some measures that CAIDA has used in previous research papers [24,25]
and have provided the definitions below. We later augment with other measures.
Average vertex degree (k), is the ratio of edges to vertices, where n is the number of vertices





This is the average degree of all the degrees in the graph, and is derived from the first theorem of
graph theory.6 This is considered one of the coarsest measurements for graph comparison, but
serves as an easy reference when comparing two large graphs. Additionally, a topology whose
graph has a larger average vertex degree is likely to be more efficient and robust than those of
6The sum of degrees is twice the number of edges in the graph.
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lower average vertex degree. We use v for vertices and k for the degree of the vertex.
Average clustering coefficient for a graph G is the average,
C =
1
n ∑v ∈ G
cv
where n is the number of vertices in G [26].
Additionally, we will examine a few other measures: the transitivity [27], degree Pearson
correlation coefficient [28], VSD and ESD [5].
Similar to clustering, transitivity [27] computes the fraction of all possible triangles present in




A triad is a path (see Section 3.2) on three vertices that has the possibility of being a triangle or
a path of length three.
We use the degree Pearson correlation coefficient to compute the degree assortativity of a









( j2i + k
2
i )− [M−1∑i( ji+ ki)]2
where ji, ki are the degrees of the vertices at the ends of the ith edge, with i= 1, ...,M [29]. This
is used to measure the similarity of connections in the graph with respect to the vertex degree
of the hubs. An example of each is displayed in Figure 3.5. The assortative graphs, 3.5a, show
a preference of hubs to link to each other. While a disassortative graph, 3.5c, the hubs seem to
avoid each other.
A recently introduced comparison [5], is the VSD and ESD, which measure the percentage of
change between two graphs either in terms of the vertices or the edges. The below definitions
and examples for VSD and ESD were taken from [5].
Definition 3.3.1. For two graphs G and H, the vertex symmetric difference vsd(G,H) is defined
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(a) Assortative (b) Neutral (c) Disassortative
Figure 3.5: Example graphs for degree Pearson correlation coefficient from [30].
to be:
vsd(G,H) =
|V (G)\V (H)|+ |V (H)\V (G)|
|V (G)|+ |V (H)| .













Figure 3.6: Example to illustrate vsd and esd between two graphs from [5].
vsd(G,H) =
|V (G)\V (H)|+ |V (H)\V (G)|












Informally, we first count the edges present in one graph and not the other and then reversed.
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This is then normalized over the total number of edges in both the graphs, so that it is relative
to the size of the graphs.
In the case where graphs G and H have exactly the same edges, esd(G,H) = 0. If graphs G and
H are disjoint, or have totally different edges, esd(G,H) = 1.
Thus, we see that the esd of any two graphs, G and H, lies in the closed interval [0,1] (i.e.,
0≤ esd(G,H)≤ 1).
On this scale, we are able to say, intuitively, if the difference between the two graphs (edge-
wise) is significant.











In this thesis, we introduce the idea of a possible stable core. We hypothesis that the stable core
can be found by taking the generalized intersections of multiple "snapshots" of the Internet in
time. We notice the stable core measurement of the network is the part that has limited change





In this chapter, we outline our data collection procedures and explain some known limitations
of our data usage. The application to the mathematical concepts will follow in Chapter 5.
4.1 Source of Data
We used data from two topology collection methodologies, NPS and CAIDA, to accrue our two
sets of topology probing cycles and ran the NPS algorithm two additional probing cycles to
identify trends we observed in the previous probing cycles. We ran each collection technique
simultaneously7 to negate any interference with time or network load and also used the same
set of vantage points. The first set of probing cycles was run on 4 September 2013 followed by
two additional pair of probing cycles on 13 December 2013. After initial results from the two
sets of NPS and CAIDA probing cycles, we ran two additional NPS probing probing cycles to
identify if we continued to observe certain trends that we will expand upon in Chapter 5. The








Table 4.1: The dates of the corresponding probing cycles.
4.1.1 CAIDA data
CAIDA uses an active probing methodology called Archipelago (Ark), which we will also call
"CAIDA probing methodology" throughout the paper. CAIDA developed Ark to:
• reduce the effort needed to develop and deploy sophisticated large-scale measurements
7Runs were conducted back to back switching which probing method was conducted first.
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• provide a step toward a community-oriented measurement infrastructure by allowing col-
laborators to run their vetted measurement tasks on a security-hardened distributed plat-
form [31].
Ark uses coordinated large-scale traceroute-based topology measurements from a process called
team probing to gather measurement to all routed /24’s8 [31]. The team probing dynamically
divides the IP space among three teams to provide a parallelization of all /24’s destinations,
and collects data for in about two to three days per team of 17-18 monitors. The teams operate
independently to prove the entire IP address space. Currently, CAIDA has 86 active monitors,
seen in Figure 4.1, to provide data collected in parallel, with at least one in every continent
except Antarctica [32]. The Ark measurement uses scamper, a powerful and flexible active
measurement tool which supports Internet protocol version 4 (IPv4), Internet protocol version
6 (IPv6), traceroute and ping [31]. CAIDA uses scamper because it supports transmission
control protocol (TCP), user datagram protocol (UDP), and ICMP based measurements and
Paris Traceroute variations [31].
Ark collects the data by sending probes continuously from random monitor vantage points,
within a team, to destination IP addresses. The destinations IP address prefixes are randomly
selected among the /24 space to ensure the data has representation across /24 space. Using
a tool, like sc_analysis_dump tool9 included in the scamper distribution package [33] we can
extract the information needed for this research from the probing cycles. This will be analyzed
in Chapter 5.
4.1.2 NPS Data
The NPS probing methodology is a Python script program with the goal of minimizing the time
required to gather the network information while maximizing the number of vertices and edges
discovered. The authors of the program call the technique of adaptive network mapping ingress
point spreading (IPS). IPS aims to increase probing efficiency by first inferring the number of
ingress points for a given network, then for each new probe, selecting the vantage point with
the highest likelihood to traverse an ingress point that has not been covered before [34]. The
probing methodology uses data from a prior probing cycle to infer potential ingress points at
different network boundaries for each target prefix. The process is designed to
• Discover the degree of subnetting within edge networks through and iterative interroga-
8Approx 9.5 million addresses.
9Tool that produces output in textual format of each summary trace. It is included in Appendix A.
24
Figure 4.1: The map of all CAIDA monitor locations from [32].
tion process [34].
• Discover sources of path diversity into networks by finding and exploiting the target’s
ingress points [34].
In [34], the authors state that by spreading probing across ingresses it will prevent early termi-
nation and therefore discover more diverse paths. An example of IPS is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
In Figure 4.2a, six previous vantage points are displayed to various destinations, (in red). The
desired /16 is shaded in red in Figure 4.2a and has three destination IPs and encompasses two
ingresses into the /8 that lead to paths into the /16 prefix. In Figure 4.2b, vantage points 1 and
2 are chosen as first priority in rank order list. Vantage points 1 and 2 are ranked first because
each traversed a diverse ingress in Figure 4.2a.
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However, IPS wants to discover a total rank order over all vantage points, typically larger than
these six example vantage points to discover more. Therefore, IPS expands from /16 to /15
prefixes (green shaded box in Figure 4.2b), which includes a new ingress point from point 4.
This new ingress point rank prioritizes point 4 third because vantage point 3 shared the same
/8 ingress point as point 2 in Figure 4.2a. The IPS probing methodology continues this ranking
through /14, /13, etc. until all vantage points are rank ordered.
(a) Target /16 prefix with two ingresses. (b) Expansion to find notational ingresses.
Figure 4.2: IPS example of six vantage points from [34].
4.2 Data Selection and Preparation
In Section 4.1, we described the two different probing methodologies and how each discovers
the Internet. We explained the algorithms to help the reader understand the difference in the
probing methodologies. We now explain to the reader the preparation of each probing cycle, the
approximate collection time and the time it takes to allow a computer to analyze the information
via our measures.
4.2.1 Preparation
The output from sc_analysis_dump tool10 is a list of traceroute like data. Specifically, the
data provides the information that resembles a classic IP trace as well as a round-trip time
(RTT) of packets sent and received between routers along the way. We take the data from
the sc_analysis_dump, strip the RTT information and keep the interface data. This provides a
list of interfaces and the links between them (given by the sequence of IPs as in Figure 4.3).
10A tool used to provide a list of traceroute data in a readable script. Each line contains information about the
each single trace to include interfaces visited and time between transmission. Details of the output are seen in
Appendix A.
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We then use the router interface as the vertex and identify two consecutive IPs which will be
represented by an edge. This is easily done allowing us to string the interfaces together in
order, from the first vertex to the second via an edge and the second to third via another edge in
sequence to represent the path taken for each trace. We continue this process through each trace
in the probing cycle to obtain several paths forming a union and discarding edge and vertex
multiplicity. From the union of the paths we build a graph representing a "snapshot" of the
Internet as discovered by each probing methodology. This technique allows us to compare the
graphs by the various methods described in Chapter 3. It is important to note that all interfaces
respond with their address, due to security settings, and we discard all "q" responses. We have
suggested additional future work to identify the amount discarded and possible way of assigning
the unknown routers to a geographical set, in Section 6.2
4.2.2 Resources "Time"
We previously discussed the three or more days needed to obtain a complete CAIDA cycle that
we call a "snapshot" of the Internet. We also briefly explained how one of the main goals of
the NPS probing methodology was to discover more of the Internet’s topology in less time. In
order for us to best compare CAIDA’s and NPS’s probing methodologies, we first compared
two probing cycles of each methodology collected as near simultaneously as possible using the
same monitors, (in order to negate any difference due to the time collected or traffic load on
the Internet). This allowed us to better compare the two probing cycles to each other. Each set
of probing cycles took a day to two days to collect, then another day to two to analyze. We
were able to accomplish this by using a dedicated server to run the compiling, parsing and test
continuously over the four to five day period. We also ran a few additional tests, specifically
diameter and radius testing per country, which took nearly two weeks of dedicated time on the
server per cycle.
4.2.3 Probing Data Challenges
The Internet is ever changing, making it difficult to predict and accurately map. Additionally,
not all the routers probed respond, making it difficult to know exactly which routers are cap-
tured. During both CAIDA and NPS probing methodologies, we would receive a "q" for each
unresponsive router, as seen in Figure 4.3. This meant our probe would identify a router’s ex-
istence but not its IP address. Unresponsive routers occur because many companies and users
increase the security settings on their routers to block ICMP traffic. This makes obtaining accu-
rate information increasingly difficult since in our research, we discard the routers with a "q."
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Since we discard the unresponsive routers and therefore their interfaces, some of the Internets







































Figure 4.3: Comparison of traceroutes with same source and destination addresses with "q"
response from [5].
Additionally, we used MaxMind geoIP lite database11 for geographic reference data base for IP
addresses. This is problematic because there is not a method for us to confirm the exact location
assigned to each IP address.
4.3 Methodology
In the current thesis, data from two probing methodologies (CAIDA vs. NPS) was obtained
with the goal of using graph comparisons to differentiate their outcomes. We ran general stan-
dard statistics on multiple cycles of each of the two probing methodologies, as well as the two
recently introduced metrics of VSD and ESD.
Additionally, we partitioned the data (from the probing cycles) into geographical countries to
identify the locations of the additional vertices and edges discovered by NPS probing method-
ology and not discovered by CAIDA probing methodology. We also analyzed the possibility of
11The exact method of how the database is populated is proprietary, but is known to do worse on router interfaces
than client addresses.
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any bias between the probing cycles to identify if monitor location caused the increase in found
vertices and edges in some countries.
This data was then analyzed by reapplying the same statistics per country, as well as a graphical
analysis in Gephi12, VSD and ESD, and stable core intersection since these graphs were much
smaller.
12A visual interactive graph modeler and analyzer.
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In this chapter, we explain our findings of the two topology probing methods using the pre-
defined comparison methods from [24]. We first examine each probing method’s data as a
comprehensive graph, then sub-divide the graph into geographic countries to identify if there is
bias towards a country. We also explore some possible pitfalls when using certain methods to
ensure awareness when comparing the graphs.
5.1 General Topological Comparison Between NPS Probing
Method and CAIDA Probing Method
We analyzed our data holistically using the existing measures we explained in 3.2 and 3.3 whose
validity was addressed in [25]. In Table 5.1, we identify that the NPS probing method discov-
ers more vertices and edges compared to the CAIDA probing method. We also observe that
the average vertex degree, for the first two probing cycle sets, are slightly less for the NPS
probing method, but not significantly. We believe this was attributed to the discovery of 12
percent more vertices and only 10 percent more edges, which will decrease the average de-
gree. However, after two additional NPS probing cycles, the average vertex degree increases
and is greater than the first two CAIDA probing cycles meaning additional probing cycles are
needed. We then compared the average clustering coefficient to identify if it implies difference
in the structure of the data obtained from the two probing methods. Our data, in Table 5.2, does
not support a significant difference, meaning that the structure discovered by the two probing
methods are comparable to each other. We explored the Pearson coefficient to identify any dif-
ference between how the two probing methods relate degree correlations, because the clustering
coefficients were similar. We discovered that the Pearson coefficient for NPS’s probing method
was negative, but small, which means the graph is slightly disassortative. CAIDA’s probing
method had a positive Pearson coefficient, but also very small, which would mean a slightly
assortative graph. However, we cannot draw any statistically significant conclusions from our
data to the meaning of these results, rather conjecture that NPS probing methodology is slightly
disassortative while CAIDA probing method remains slightly assortative. As future work, we
recommend the study of additional probing cycles and their comparisons in order to be able to
draw significant conclusions.
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Number Vertices Number Edges Average Node Degree
NPS 1 524,366 1,360,855 5.190
CAIDA 1 466,072 1,236,530 5.306
NPS 2 520,906 1,333,079 5.118
CAIDA 2 464,553 1,202,778 5.178
NPS 3 543,073 1,441,963 5.310
NPS 4 554,753 1,470,550 5.302
Table 5.1: The basic statistics for each probing cycle.
Average Cluster Coefficient Pearson Coefficient
NPS 1 0.017 -0.034
CAIDA 1 0.017 0.021
NPS 2 0.016 -0.033
CAIDA 2 0.017 0.039
NPS 3 0.020 -0.032
NPS 4 0.019 -0.035
Table 5.2: The connectivity table for each probing cycle.
5.1.1 Dissimilarity Measures
We compared VSD and ESD to evaluate each edge and vertex per graph to determine how
similar the graphs are per probing cycle between NPS and CAIDA probing methods. In Table
5.3, we present the VSD between all probing cycles of NPS and CAIDA probing methods. We
identify around 40 percent different interfaces/vertices between the first two NPS and CAIDA
probing cycles, which were collected nearly simultaneously, see Table 4.1. This confirms the
two probing methods discover different sets of IP of the Internet, independent of time collected.
Table 5.3 also displays the difference between NPS 3 and NPS 4 probing cycles, which were
taken nearly four months apart, see Table 4.1. This seems to confirm the ever changing Internet.
Interestingly, the VSD between NPS 1 versus NPS 2 is nearly seven percent less then CAIDA
1 versus CAIDA 2, (recall NPS 1 and CAIDA 1 at the same time, as was NPS 2 and CAIDA
2). We attribute the small difference to the randomness in target selection within /24’s for
CAIDA versus the NPS directed strategy. Furthermore, the difference between all pairwise
NPS’ probing cycles are smaller than they are to CAIDA’s probing cycles. This could mean that
NPS’ probing method discovers more stable interfaces/vertices than CAIDA’s probing method.
We will address additional possible stable core results in Section 5.1.2.
The ESD between the probing cycles displays the edges/paths that the interfaces/vertices used
to transmit the packet information between routers. Interestingly, there is nearly a 50 percent
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NPS1 NPS 2 NPS 3 NPS 4 CAIDA 1 CAIDA2
NPS 1 0.00 0.25 0.34 0.34 0.37 0.43
NPS 2 0.25 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.43 0.37
NPS 3 0.34 0.26 0.00 0.10 0.48 0.43
NPS 4 0.34 0.26 0.10 0.00 0.48 0.44
CAIDA 1 0.37 0.43 0.48 0.48 0.00 0.32
CAIDA 2 0.43 0.37 0.43 0.44 0.32 0.00
Table 5.3: The values of VSD per probing cycle.
difference in the edges the packets took between the probing cycles comparing the two probing
methodologies, shown in Table 5.4. The difference appears to hold regardless of the probing
method. There is a slight outlier between NPS 3 and NPS 4 probing cycles which only differ by
24 percent. We attribute this to the small time frame between the same probing methodology
(four days between NPS 3 and NPS 4 probing methods versus the nearly four months between
NPS 1, NPS 2, NPS 3/4, CAIDA 1 and CAIDA 2 probing cycles).
NPS 1 NPS 2 NPS 3 NPS 4 CAIDA 1 CAIDA 2
NPS 1 0.00 0.43 0.54 0.54 0.41 0.54
NPS 2 0.43 0.00 0.44 0.44 0.54 0.42
NPS 3 0.54 0.44 0.00 0.24 0.62 0.54
NPS 4 0.54 0.44 0.24 0.00 0.62 0.55
CAIDA 1 0.41 0.54 0.62 0.62 0.00 0.46
CAIDA 2 0.54 0.42 0.54 0.55 0.46 0.00
Table 5.4: The values of ESD per probing cycle.
5.1.2 Commonality Measures
This subsection introduces the idea of measuring a stable core, by which we mean the part of
the Internet that is discovered by the majority of the probing cycles, see Section 3.3. We used
intersections of probing cycles to discover the graph (vertices and edges) that all probing cycles
discovered. The basic statistics of the possible stable core are found in Table 5.5. We predicted
that the number of vertices and edges would decrease to a smaller subset during every iteration,
which our analysis supports. Interestingly, the vertex and edge counts still remain relatively
large, about 40 percent of the original graphs. This shows promising evidence that there exist a
relatively stable core, but we need to compare additional probing cycles before we can confirm.
We believe that with this knowledge we could possibly identify the preferred crucial Internet
infrastructure that is important to the speed of the Internet we currently enjoy and identify those
paths that are critical for vulnerability assessments.
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Node Count Edge Count Avg Degree Clustering Pearson
Both CAIDA Graphs 316,422 659,788 4.170 0.011 0.084
First Two NPS 392,791 761,599 3.878 0.008 -0.025
Intersection of NPS 1-2
and CAIDA 1-2
233,607 432,412 3.702 0.007 0.083
Intersection NPS 1-2,
CAIDA 1-2 with NPS 3
204,860 334,689 3.267 0.005 0.092
Intersection NPS 1-2,
CAIDA 1-2 withNPS 4
204,508 333,928 3.266 0.005 0.094
Table 5.5: The graph statistics for the intersection of graphs.
We tested our conjecture of the existance of a stable core using the intersection of the first
four graphs, (NPS 1, NPS 2 and CAIDA 1 and CAIDA 2) and tested them on the last two
probing cycles, (NPS 3 and NPS 4). In Table 5.5, the test on both NPS 3 and NPS 4 both have
a vertex count difference of only 352 vertices/IPs with only an edge count difference of only
761. This is significant since there are over 500,000 vertices and over 1,200,000 edges for each
cycle. This shows that the intersections of the graphs over time might lead to the discovery of
a stable core. The researchers recommend additional future probing cycles to test to identify
the rate of change and determine the number of probing cycles to have statistical data to ensure
validity to our findings. We will also test the stable core conjecture on smaller country graphs
in Section 5.2.3.
5.2 Per Country Topological Comparison Between NPS and
CAIDA Probing Methods
From our findings in Section 5, we parsed the cycles to identify the countries each traversed
to determine if bias existed. In Figure 5.113, both NPS and CAIDA probing methods discover
the same top 10 countries for vertex and edge count, but NPS’ probing method found signifi-
cantly more IPs in the United States, China and South Korea than CAIDA’s probing method.
In Figure 5.2, NPS probing method also did better at discovering more edges in the United
States, China and significantly better in South Korea. It makes sense for a probing method to
probabilistically find more vertices and edges in China and the United States because both have
more users than any other country [2]; see Table 5.8 and discussion in Section 5.2.1 we will
further discuss. It is worth mentioning that there are not any monitors in China. That is, we
analyzed the vantage point monitors, seen in Figure 5.3, to see if there was any discovery bias
13The x-axis is by country aligned per probing iteration.
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from monitor vantage point. Our data, from the monitor vantage point, does not support any
monitor bias because they used nearly the same monitor vantage points with little effect on IP
discovery per probing cycle.
Figure 5.1: The vertex count per country.
We compared the clustering coefficient to test connectivity of the different cycles at the country
level. In Figure 5.4, each probing method follows generally the same slope. The graph is
skewed a little for NPS probing method because it does not find as many countries as CAIDA
probing. Notice, however that NPS probing method still finds the same amount of connected
countries. In fact, NPS found 23 percent of countries with a clustering coefficient of zero, while
CAIDA finds 27 percent of countries with a clustering coefficient of zero. This means NPS
probing method may actually be better at finding connectivity than CAIDA probing method.
Next, we compared highest and lowest country clustering coefficient to determine which coun-
tries were more strongly connected. We conjectured the clustering coefficient might identify
if there was any trend to security or censorship. We first hypothesized that a country with a
high clustering coefficient would show less censored countries, while a country with a low clus-
tering coefficient would mean more censorship. We conjectured this because a country with a
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CAIDA 1 CAIDA 2 NPS 1 NPS 2 NPS 3 NPS 4
United States 129,161 125,379 138,127 133,330 136,636 139,258
China 57,099 57,528 70,892 71,687 72,889 74,013
Japan 40,211 39,653 41,177 40,273 41,514 42,364
South Korea 30,889 30,377 38,283 37,704 39,547 40,371
Germany 24,571 23,679 28,423 28,437 29,320 29,843
Great Britain 23,781 22,776 24,475 23,416 24,962 24,950
Brazil 22,904 21,997 24,377 22,927 24,491 25,032
Canada 22,044 21,156 21,815 20,298 22,097 22,672
Russian Federation 19,103 18,023 16,772 15,142 16,756 17,031
Italy 16,108 15,293 16,621 15,267 15,769 16,710
Netherlands 12,336 11,644 16,350 16,216 17,678 18,591
Table 5.6: Sample of the top vertex count by country.
Figure 5.2: The edge count per country.
low clustering coefficient will show less of the observed Internet or only the external routers
leading to paths. Unfortunately, our data did not support our hypothesis because our data did
not recognize known heavily censored countries. Additionally, we observed often low cluster-
ing coefficient countries were small island countries, that happen to have few vertices and few
edges, hence the presence of a few triangles (3-cycles) made the clustering coefficient large.
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CAIDA 1 CAIDA 2 NPS 1 NPS 2 NPS 3 NPS 4
United States 325,872 306,171 314,434 292,848 306,988 314,289
China 174,641 179,043 239,681 253,089 273,374 280,173
South Korea 75,106 73,005 133,237 131,953 141,314 144,373
Japan 86,226 87,284 87,437 89,684 93,395 95,700
Brazil 68,526 64,707 74,115 69,335 76,316 76,224
Germany 63,569 58,029 68,667 64,492 67,361 69,180
Great Britain 60,580 56,948 64,253 59,939 61,600 61,430
Canada 64,805 56,432 59,141 50,198 55,732 56,580
Italy 47,068 43,011 42,475 38,837 40,879 42,502
Spain 44,646 37,571 39,064 32,272 34,504 35,738
Russian Federation 48,455 42,525 38,778 32,849 37,705 38,176
Sweden 30,414 25,742 33,919 32,295 33,119 35,144
France 38,623 35,852 31,458 26,864 26,643 27,285
Netherlands 31,746 26,974 31,308 27,757 30,494 31,418
Table 5.7: Sample of the top edge count by country.
Figure 5.3: The unique monitor location per probing cycle.
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Figure 5.4: The clustering coefficient distributions by country.
5.2.1 Country IP Allocation per Graph
We previously noted the significantly larger number of vertex and edge counts of the NPS
probing method for discovering IP addresses within China and South Korea, but still have not
identified the reason. We already tested the monitor location in Section 5.2 without any results.
This led us to analyze known allocated IP space to identify any trends. Table 5.8 displays the
assigned sorted IP space percentage per country to what we discovered during each probing
cycle.14 We normalized each country’s probing cycle discovery by the number of total vertices
to have a method of comparison. We did this because the assigned IP space percentages are
done in a similar fashion by dividing the total assigned IP space for each country by the total
possible IP space. In Table 5.8, we see the NPS and CAIDA probing methodologies match the
known percentages of a country’s allocated IP space. Interestingly, none of the probing cycles
discover the 35 percent that the United States has assigned. However, in all seven cycles the
United States had the largest discovered IP space. A possible reason for this is the number
of unresponsive routers, "q" as discussed in Section 4.2.3, that were possibly returned within
14List of all countries found Appendix B.
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the United States. We would suggest additional research in this area to identify probabilistic
IP/vertex location from the returned "q" for better representation.
Assigned
IP Space
CAIDA 1 CAIDA 2 NPS 1 NPS 2 NPS 3 NPS 4
United States 35.90% 14.41% 14.72% 16.18% 16.58% 16.07% 16.00%
China 7.70% 6.37% 6.75% 8.30% 8.91% 8.57% 8.50%
Japan 4.70% 4.49% 4.65% 4.82% 5.01% 4.88% 4.87%
Great Britain 2.90% 2.65% 2.67% 2.87% 2.91% 2.94% 2.87%
Germany 2.80% 2.74% 2.78% 3.33% 3.54% 3.45% 3.43%
South Korea 2.60% 3.45% 3.57% 4.48% 4.69% 4.65% 4.64%
France 2.20% 1.66% 1.71% 1.69% 1.68% 1.55% 1.55%
Canada 1.90% 2.46% 2.48% 2.56% 2.52% 2.60% 2.60%
Italy 1.20% 1.80% 1.79% 1.95% 1.90% 1.85% 1.92%
Brazil 1.10% 2.56% 2.58% 2.86% 2.85% 2.88% 2.88%
Australia 1.10% 1.28% 1.33% 1.18% 1.17% 1.17% 1.14%
Netherlands 1.10% 1.38% 1.37% 1.91% 2.02% 2.08% 2.14%
Russian Fed-
eration
1.00% 2.13% 2.12% 1.96% 1.88% 1.97% 1.96%
Taiwan 0.80% 1.39% 1.40% 1.12% 1.11% 1.16% 1.15%
India 0.80% 1.15% 1.10% 1.10% 1.01% 1.03% 1.02%
Table 5.8: The top 15 countries of IP space allocation.
5.2.2 Some results on the diameter and radius for the country graphs
We analyzed the data to identify if one probing method was better at discovering depth versus
breadth, previously discussed in Section 3.2. We did this by subtracting the radius from the
diameter for each graph. Recall from 3.2, the diameter was the longest shortest path, while the
radius was the smallest eccentricity. Therefore, the higher difference between the diameter and
the radius, would indicate better breadth into a network, while a smaller number would indicate
better depth. Unfortunately, to compute the radius and diameter each graph must be connected.
This was a problem when we parsed our data to the country level, because nearly a third of the
countries were not connected due to unresponsive routers or other reasons. In Figure 5.5, we
can see that there is a fairly even distribution with the mean diameter minus radius, µ = .37
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and most of the countries falling within two standard deviations, (the dashed lines). We also
annotated the third standard deviation with a solid line and identified the outliers by name.
Interestingly, the outliers were all island nations. However, we were still able to compare the
remaining data and we observed that NPS discovered eight percent more breadth than CAIDA.
Figure 5.5: The diameter minus the radius (depth versus breadth).
5.2.3 Case Studies for some Countries
From our results in Section 5.2, we chose to further analyze China, and South Korea. We also
will display an issue we discovered when comparing the clustering coefficients per country,
specifically with Wallis and Futuna.
Case Study: China
The NPS probing methodology discovered significantly more vertices and edges than the CAIDA
probing methodology, as seen in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7. We further explored the data to deter-
mine if the monitor vantage point impacted the results. In Figure 5.6, we notice that the probing
algorithms used nearly the same monitor vantage points for each probing cycle. We determine
from this data that the monitor vantage point has little effect on the discovery since nearly the
same monitor vantage points were used. It is important to note that generally vantage point does
have a major impact on discovered topology, but our data did not.
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Figure 5.6: The probing monitors for China.
Table 5.9 displays the results of the VSD. We identified an average change in vertices of 30-50
percent appear between CAIDA 1 and the NPS probing methods. Interestingly the difference
between NPS 1 and CAIDA 1 are 30-52 percent different even though they were probed nearly
simultaneously. This further shows how different the probing methods are at discovering the
Internet. In Table 5.10, the ESD is highest between CAIDA 1 and the last two NPS probing
methods. These results show how the different probing methodologies discover different sets of
IPs even in smaller subgraphs. It also confirms the ever changing presence of the Internet.
NPS 1 NPS 2 NPS 3 NPS 4 CAIDA 1 CAIDA 2
NPS 1 0.00 0.25 0.42 0.42 0.30 0.52
NPS 2 0.25 0.00 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.29
NPS 3 0.42 0.34 0.00 0.10 0.57 0.50
NPS 4 0.42 0.34 0.10 0.00 0.57 0.50
CAIDA 1 0.30 0.36 0.57 0.57 0.00 0.30
CAIDA 2 0.52 0.29 0.50 0.50 0.30 0.00
Table 5.9: The VSD per graph for China.
We also tried to discover the existence of a stable core within China. In Table 5.11, we con-
ducted analysis on the first four graphs (first two NPS and first two CAIDA) as learning and
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NPS 1 NPS 2 NPS 3 NPS 4 CAIDA 1 CAIDA 2
NPS 1 0.00 0.51 0.61 0.61 0.41 0.63
NPS 2 0.51 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.42
NPS 3 0.61 0.50 0.00 0.20 0.69 0.59
NPS 4 0.61 0.50 0.20 0.00 0.70 0.60
CAIDA 1 0.41 0.53 0.69 0.70 0.00 0.49
CAIDA 2 0.63 0.42 0.59 0.60 0.49 0.00
Table 5.10: The ESD per graph for China.
comparing on the remaining two NPS probing cycles (NPS 3 and NPS 4). We identified that
the intersection of the first four graphs might have identified a possible stable core because
when we compared to NPS 3 and NPS 4 graphs, the difference was only ten vertices and less
than a thousand edges. An additional interesting insight is how quickly China went from an
average vertex count of approx 60,000 (in Table 5.6) to only 5,000 then 2,500 (in Table 5.11).
This could show how volatile China’s Internet topology is, especially when one compares the
results to those of South Korea in Section 5.2.3. We hypothesis this may be caused by Chinas
restrictive Internet, but further work is needed to confirm.
Graphs Node Count Edge Count Avg Degree Clustering Pearson
Both CAIDA Graphs 5,083 7,704 3.031 0.011 0.027
First Two NPS 4,722 6,091 2.580 0.015 -0.086
2 CAIDA vs 2 NPS 3,158 4,175 2.644 0.012 0.020
Intersection NPS 1-2, CAIDA 1-2 with NPS 3 2,564 3,013 2.350 0.011 0.044
Intersection NPS 1-2, CAIDA 1-2 with NPS 4 2,554 2,987 2.339 0.012 0.053
Table 5.11: The basic stats of China’s stable core.
South Korea
As well, South Korea was interesting because of the difference in discovered vertices and edges
from the NPS and CAIDA probing methodologies. Table 5.12 displays the VSD results from the
probing cycles. The trend continues in the difference between the greatest change between the
CAIDA and the NPS probing methodologies. In Table 5.13, the ESD shows a large difference in
those edges that are detected per probing cycle, but not as much as China. Again, the large VSD
and ESD between cycles confirms the ever changing inferred topology. When we conducted the
stable core testing against the probing cycles for South Korea, the vertex and edge counts of the
intersection graphs only decrease by approx 40 percent, from average of 37,000 vertices (in
Table 5.6) to approximately 15,000 vertices (in Table 5.14). This is intriguing because we
observed a large decrease in the graph to stable core graphs (compared that found in Table 5.6
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and Table 5.7) of China but not in South Korea. The results might show that South Korea has a
more stable Internet.
NPS 1 NPS 2 NPS 3 NPS 4 CAIDA 1 CAIDA 2
NPS 1 0.00 0.22 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.38
NPS 2 0.22 0.00 0.24 0.24 0.36 0.30
NPS 3 0.30 0.24 0.00 0.10 0.41 0.37
NPS 4 0.31 0.24 0.10 0.00 0.41 0.37
CAIDA 1 0.31 0.36 0.41 0.41 0.00 0.31
CAIDA 2 0.38 0.30 0.37 0.37 0.31 0.00
Table 5.12: The VSD per graph for South Korea.
NPS 1 NPS 2 NPS 3 NPS 4 CAIDA 1 CAIDA 2
NPS 1 0.00 0.37 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.57
NPS 2 0.37 0.00 0.39 0.39 0.56 0.48
NPS 3 0.46 0.39 0.00 0.22 0.62 0.58
NPS 4 0.47 0.39 0.22 0.00 0.63 0.58
CAIDA 1 0.47 0.56 0.62 0.63 0.00 0.50
CAIDA 2 0.57 0.48 0.58 0.58 0.50 0.00
Table 5.13: The ESD per graph for South Korea.
Graphs Node Count Edge Count Avg Degree Clustering Pearson
Both CAIDA Graphs 29,706 83,838 5.645 0.006 0.151
First Two NPS 21,080 37,087 3.519 0.009 0.083
2 CAIDA vs 2 NPS 17,164 29,556 3.444 0.006 0.085
Intersection NPS 1-2, CAIDA 1-2 with NPS 3 15,436 24,387 3.160 0.005 0.126
Intersection NPS 1-2, CAIDA 1-2 with NPS 4 15,443 24,296 3.147 0.005 0.126
Table 5.14: The basic stats of South Korea’s stable core.
Wallis and Futuna
In Section 5.2 we discussed how the clustering coefficient could easily skew results if con-
sidered in isolation. We identified Wallis and Futuna, after sorting the data to identify those
countries with the highest clustering coefficients. We originally conjectured the possibility of
high clustering coefficient with countries that restrict control of the Internet, however our data
did not support this conjecture. We found countries, (e.g., Wallis and Futuna in Figure 5.7), that
43
Figure 5.7: Graph of Wallis and Futuna with high clustering coefficient.
had high clustering coefficient, but were not on any lists of known Internet restricted countries.
Wallis and Futuna is a relatively small nation but it had one of the highest clustering coefficients
in one of our cycles because of the relatively small number of vertices connected to each other,
almost a tree, so a few triangles (3-cycles) made a big impact, circled in Figure 5.7. This outlier
was easy to visualize due to the small number of overall vertices, but larger graphs may not
easily show this result. We caution the use of clustering coefficient when comparing graphs
unless you can easily visualize your graph or other measures are used in combination with the
clustering coefficient (such as density of edges in a graph).
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CHAPTER 6:
Future Work and Conclusion
In this chapter, we present our findings and provide insights into areas that might require further
research.
6.1 Summary
Our goal was to provide an in-depth comparison of the NPS probing methodology and CAIDA
probing methodology using existing graphical measurements. We also applied the same anal-
ysis to country specific sub-sets to see how the measurements behave with some surprising
results. There is still an abundance of research that is needed to understand how the Internet is
connected and its properties.
6.2 Future Work
We have barely scraped the surface for using these measurements, and there remains much to
be explored. The following are some areas for possible future research.
(1) Perform more statistical analysis on additional runs
We were limited on the amount of probing cycles we could accomplish during the du-
ration of our research. Making specific claims, such as the Pearson coefficient, about
how the Internet or algorithms behaves as a result of this study is not statistically sup-
ported. We also only used a limited number of monitor vantage points and suggest a
more methodical study of how the probing cycles discover topology differ by vantage
point. Specifically, do certain monitors discover more depending on geographic region,
or does the geographic distance even affect the return of trace information per destination
IP.
(2) Does the stable core of the Internet exist or does a stable core exist in a sub-set of the In-
ternet? Does the existence of a stable core give us any additional information, specifically
threat vulnerability and assessment?
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In Chapter 5, we conjectured that the intersections of intersections would produce a stable
core of vertices that we could use to conduct threat analysis and other network security
studies. We introduced the intersection of intersections to discover the stable core, but
did not prove how many graph intersections it would take to confirm the existence of a
stable core. Additionally, it would be interesting to know if the number of probing cycles
needed to discover a stable core differ per country or other subset. Specifically, does a
small set of intersection vertices compared to the total vertex found indicate a censored
or heavily restricted Internet region, similar to our results for China in Section 5.2.3.
(3) How many unions of graphs does it take to represent the known IP allocation per country?
We studied the distribution of vertices discovered per country by the known alloted IP
space assigned in Section 5.2.1 and noted the disparity of those discovered versus the
amount allocated. It would be interesting to identify how many probing cycles it would
take to gather enough data to provide an accurate distribution.
(4) Identify the number of "q" returns per country and group them with the number of dis-
covered IP vertices.
We recommend further study of this to identify if the percentage of discovered IPs more
closely represents that of the known IP allocation by country and further work from [35].
The actual location of the "q" is difficult if not impossible to know, but you can infer the
location of the router that returns the "q" by the preceding and following router locations.
The researchers propose a possible use of bins for those "q" returned. For example, if a
trace returned US, US, "q", US, CH, then it would fall into a confident bin for US. Al-
ternatively, if a trace returned (US, US, "q", "q", CH), then the "q"s could be apart of the
United States or China, therefore a second bin per country for possible "q"s that belong
to the country. Obviously there would be a lot of inferring to the location in this process,
and we only suggest this method, while other methods could also work.
6.3 Conclusion
We performed numerous known standard graph comparisons in Section 5. Some of the results
led to additional questions instead of answering our original questions, but we have made some
headway. The CAIDA and NPS probing methodologies both accomplish the same task of giving
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an inferred map of the Internet topology, though NPS seems to discover more IPs in less time,
as suggested in [36], from one probing cycle. In our research, we provided a concise study for
a better understanding about the inferred representation of each of the probing methodologies.
The researchers also offer additional directions to provide better insight into the inferred topol-
ogy. Specifically, we hope our conjecture of a stable core, (see Section 5.2.3 and Section 5.2.3)
could prove impactful.
One of the greatest challenges to this study was (1) the sheer size of the data sets15 that we
had to first strip into usable forms, and (2) needing a dedicated server to run the analytical
analysis. Internet topology is not a topic that will have a simple solution from a single paper, but
continued work to understand how components link and share the information on the Internet
can prove insightful.
We also believe some of the metrics we used could be useful in other complex networks, such as
biological and social networks. It could prove insightful to understand the most logical next step
or underlying structure or the existence of a stable core or backbone for information distribution.
15Typical size of graph comparisons used six to ten Gigabyte (GB) of RAM per test for upwards of 14 days.
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APPENDIX A:
SC Analysis Dump Format
# =======================================================================
# This file contains an ASCII representation of the IPv4 paths stored in
# the binary skitter arts++ and scamper warts file formats.
#




# There is one trace per line, with the following tab-separated fields:
#
#
# 1. Key -- Indicates the type of line and determines the meaning of the
# remaining fields. This will always be ’T’ for an IP trace.
#
# -------------------- Header Fields ------------------
#
# 2. Source -- Source IP of skitter/scamper monitor performing the trace.
#
# 3. Destination -- Destination IP being traced.
#
# 4. ListId -- ID of the destination list containing this destination
# address.
#
# This value will be zero if no list ID was provided. (uint32_t)
#
# 5. CycleId -- ID of current probing cycle (a cycle is a single run
# through a given list). For skitter traces, cycle IDs
# will be equal to or slightly earlier than the timestamp
# of the first trace in each cycle. There is no standard
# interpretation for scamper cycle IDs.
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## This value will be zero if no cycle ID was provided. (uint32_t)
#
# 6. Timestamp -- Timestamp when trace began to this destination.
#
# -------------------- Reply Fields ------------------
#
# 7. DestReplied -- Whether a response from the destination was received.
#
# R - Replied, reply was received
# N - Not-replied, no reply was received;
# Since skitter sends a packet with a TTL of 255 when it halts
# probing, it is still possible for the final destination to
# send a reply and for the HaltReasonData (see below) to not
# equal no_halt. Note: scamper does not perform this last-ditch
# probing at TTL 255.
#
# 8. DestRTT -- RTT (ms) of first response packet from destination.
# 0 if DestReplied is N.
#
# 9. RequestTTL -- TTL set in request packet which elicited a response
# (echo reply) from the destination.
# 0 if DestReplied is N.
#
# 10. ReplyTTL -- TTL found in reply packet from destination;
# 0 if DestReplied is N.
#
# -------------------- Halt Fields ------------------
#
# 11. HaltReason -- The reason, if any, why incremental probing stopped.
#





# S (success/no_halt) 0
# U (icmp_unreachable) icmp_code
# L (loop_detected) loop_length
# G (gap_detected) gap_limit
#
# -------------------- Path Fields ------------------
#
# 13. PathComplete -- Whether all hops to destination were found.
#
# C - Complete, all hops found
# I - Incomplete, at least one hop is missing (i.e., did not
# respond)
#
# 14. PerHopData -- Response data for the first hop.
#
# If multiple IP addresses respond at the same hop, response data
# for each IP address are separated by semicolons:
#
# IP,RTT,numTries (for only one responding IP)




# IP -- IP address which sent a TTL expired packet
# RTT -- RTT of the TTL expired packet
# num_tries -- num tries before response received from TTL.
#
# This field will have the value ’q’ if there was no response at
# this hop.
#
# 15. PerHopData -- Response data for the second hop in the same format





# N. PerHopData -- Response data for the destination




IP Space by Country
COUNTRY CAIDA 1 CAIDA 2 NPS1 NPS2 NPS 3 NPS 4
Afghanistan 0.074% 0.081% 0.042% 0.026% 0.028% 0.026%
Albania 0.082% 0.083% 0.037% 0.042% 0.053% 0.053%
Algeria 0.292% 0.262% 0.147% 0.067% 0.080% 0.083%
American Samoa 0.009% 0.010% 0.013% 0.006% 0.016% 0.013%
Andorra 0.022% 0.024% 0.003% 0.007% 0.006% 0.006%
Angola 0.129% 0.116% 0.074% 0.090% 0.095% 0.095%
Anguilla 0.006% 0.008% 0.002% #N/A 0.007% 0.003%
Antarctica 0.030% 0.035% 0.002% 0.003% 0.004% 0.004%
Antigua and Barbuda 0.024% 0.024% 0.005% 0.012% 0.008% 0.007%
Argentina 0.669% 0.660% 0.707% 0.661% 0.650% 0.640%
Armenia 0.157% 0.159% 0.103% 0.098% 0.129% 0.122%
Aruba 0.030% 0.028% 0.004% 0.005% 0.002% 0.002%
Australia 1.282% 1.331% 1.180% 1.168% 1.170% 1.135%
Austria 0.756% 0.769% 0.697% 0.701% 0.699% 0.722%
Azerbaidjan 0.132% 0.123% 0.058% 0.054% 0.069% 0.069%
Bahamas 0.129% 0.133% 0.056% 0.055% 0.064% 0.062%
Bahrain 0.171% 0.181% 0.146% 0.140% 0.154% 0.150%
Bangladesh 0.232% 0.231% 0.219% 0.193% 0.213% 0.209%
Barbados 0.066% 0.065% 0.080% 0.062% 0.077% 0.076%
Belarus 0.141% 0.170% 0.126% 0.118% 0.135% 0.132%
Belgium 0.643% 0.637% 0.500% 0.461% 0.533% 0.536%
Belize 0.169% 0.172% 0.069% 0.033% 0.040% 0.032%
Benin 0.011% 0.011% 0.005% 0.007% 0.004% 0.004%
Bermuda 0.124% 0.130% 0.108% 0.118% 0.120% 0.113%
Bhutan 0.047% 0.050% 0.094% 0.080% 0.090% 0.087%
Bolivia 0.191% 0.180% 0.261% 0.230% 0.212% 0.211%
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.264% 0.256% 0.309% 0.314% 0.303% 0.305%
Botswana 0.053% 0.051% 0.042% 0.048% 0.039% 0.038%
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Brazil 2.555% 2.582% 2.855% 2.851% 2.880% 2.876%
British Indian Ocean Territory 0.004% 0.004% #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
Brunei Darussalam 0.074% 0.075% 0.037% 0.035% 0.035% 0.036%
Bulgaria 0.547% 0.530% 0.566% 0.511% 0.521% 0.515%
Burkina Faso 0.042% 0.051% 0.097% 0.075% 0.090% 0.089%
Burundi 0.008% 0.006% #N/A #N/A 0.001% 0.001%
Cambodia 0.084% 0.086% 0.061% 0.076% 0.109% 0.112%
Cameroon 0.075% 0.075% 0.080% 0.054% 0.060% 0.064%
Canada 2.459% 2.483% 2.555% 2.524% 2.598% 2.605%
Cape Verde 0.010% 0.011% 0.013% 0.010% 0.020% 0.018%
Cayman Islands 0.043% 0.043% 0.029% 0.029% 0.034% 0.030%
Central African Republic 0.003% 0.003% #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
Chad 0.004% 0.002% 0.002% #N/A 0.001% 0.002%
Chile 0.539% 0.540% 0.399% 0.382% 0.383% 0.390%
China 6.370% 6.752% 8.303% 8.915% 8.571% 8.504%
Christmas Island 0.002% 0.002% #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
Cocos (Keeling) Islands 0.003% 0.004% #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
Colombia 0.607% 0.575% 0.600% 0.587% 0.552% 0.557%
Comoros 0.016% 0.013% 0.005% 0.007% 0.008% 0.018%
Congo 0.023% 0.020% 0.024% 0.017% 0.011% 0.016%
Cook Islands 0.026% 0.025% 0.028% 0.033% 0.049% 0.047%
Costa Rica 0.376% 0.321% 0.204% 0.193% 0.165% 0.161%
Croatia 0.400% 0.340% 0.335% 0.294% 0.283% 0.284%
Cuba 0.099% 0.108% 0.063% 0.035% 0.037% 0.036%
Cyprus 0.212% 0.196% 0.233% 0.191% 0.167% 0.168%
Czech Republic 1.046% 1.033% 1.197% 1.177% 1.178% 1.211%
Denmark 0.804% 0.773% 0.899% 0.908% 0.940% 0.941%
Djibouti 0.041% 0.075% 0.013% 0.013% 0.013% 0.013%
Dominica 0.023% 0.029% 0.017% 0.010% 0.015% 0.015%
Dominican Republic 0.263% 0.252% 0.121% 0.104% 0.115% 0.109%
Ecuador 0.294% 0.301% 0.354% 0.335% 0.324% 0.312%
Egypt 0.773% 0.709% 0.372% 0.379% 0.349% 0.345%
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El Salvador 0.231% 0.220% 0.105% 0.121% 0.119% 0.114%
Equatorial Guinea 0.030% 0.028% 0.010% 0.026% 0.025% 0.029%
Eritrea 0.003% 0.005% #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
Estonia 0.332% 0.309% 0.509% 0.484% 0.486% 0.486%
Ethiopia 0.089% 0.087% 0.050% 0.032% 0.044% 0.043%
Falkland Islands 0.006% 0.009% 0.005% 0.006% 0.031% 0.029%
Faroe Islands 0.071% 0.069% 0.053% 0.048% 0.044% 0.044%
Fiji 0.129% 0.122% 0.049% 0.051% 0.053% 0.046%
Finland 0.722% 0.704% 0.574% 0.547% 0.546% 0.543%
France 1.662% 1.713% 1.687% 1.680% 1.548% 1.546%
France (European Territory) 0.003% 0.002% 0.002% #N/A 0.001% 0.001%
French Guyana 0.077% 0.076% 0.019% 0.020% 0.022% 0.021%
French Southern Territories 0.004% 0.002% #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
Gabon 0.152% 0.158% 0.050% 0.062% 0.070% 0.069%
Gambia 0.002% 0.004% #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
Georgia 0.249% 0.252% 0.339% 0.308% 0.318% 0.331%
Germany 2.741% 2.779% 3.329% 3.536% 3.448% 3.429%
Ghana 0.142% 0.166% 0.065% 0.047% 0.116% 0.115%
Gibraltar 0.017% 0.014% 0.013% 0.016% 0.014% 0.013%
Great Britain 2.653% 2.673% 2.867% 2.912% 2.935% 2.867%
Greece 0.623% 0.556% 0.517% 0.504% 0.488% 0.495%
Greenland 0.035% 0.035% 0.026% 0.060% 0.027% 0.043%
Grenada 0.028% 0.030% 0.031% 0.017% 0.030% 0.025%
Guadeloupe (French) 0.132% 0.143% 0.089% 0.092% 0.089% 0.088%
Guam (USA) 0.144% 0.133% 0.104% 0.099% 0.100% 0.093%
Guatemala 0.155% 0.152% 0.168% 0.095% 0.172% 0.182%
Guinea 0.045% 0.040% 0.023% 0.024% 0.032% 0.020%
Guinea Bissau 0.003% 0.002% #N/A #N/A 0.001% 0.001%
Guyana 0.017% 0.019% 0.048% 0.022% 0.023% 0.023%
Haiti 0.106% 0.079% 0.041% 0.048% 0.043% 0.044%
Honduras 0.176% 0.170% 0.095% 0.103% 0.102% 0.100%
Hong Kong 0.854% 0.872% 1.071% 1.056% 1.040% 1.043%
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Hungary 0.706% 0.680% 0.643% 0.679% 0.652% 0.656%
Iceland 0.294% 0.260% 0.194% 0.195% 0.189% 0.189%
India 1.147% 1.096% 1.101% 1.011% 1.031% 1.022%
Indonesia 0.515% 0.489% 0.508% 0.493% 0.532% 0.541%
Iran 0.679% 0.684% 0.498% 0.500% 0.480% 0.503%
Iraq 0.226% 0.243% 0.123% 0.104% 0.131% 0.129%
Ireland 0.606% 0.609% 0.594% 0.559% 0.583% 0.563%
Israel 0.631% 0.608% 0.613% 0.580% 0.582% 0.591%
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